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ARTICLES
FACING THE FUTURE-LIFE WITHOUT
GLASS-STEAGALL
William M, Isaac* and Melanie L. Fein**
The Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall or the Act)' is among the last of a
dying breed of bank regulatory statutes enacted when bank regulation was in
its infancy and Congress' response to banking problems was to erect rigid
walls confining financial institutions to narrow bounds. Interstate banking
barriers2 and interest rate ceilings3 are other prominent members of that
class of statutes which, like Glass-Steagall, for so many years insulated the
banking system from competitive pressures and perceived threats to banking
safety and soundness but left it ill-equipped to adapt to the changes wrought
by inflation, new competitors, and technological innovations. These forces
have redefined the financial services marketplace on a global scale, making
the old boundaries within which banks are allowed to compete largely irrele-
Partner, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.; Managing Director and Chief Execu-
tive Officer, The Secura Group; Former Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, 1981-1985.
** Associate, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.; Former Senior Counsel, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1979-1986.
1. The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32 of
the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(Seventh), 78, 377-78 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
2. The McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982), generally prohibits a national bank from
establishing branch offices outside of the state where it is headquartered. The Douglas amend-
ment to the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 1956, § 3(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982),
prohibits a bank holding company from acquiring banks outside of the state where the opera-
tions of its banking subsidiaries are principally conducted. An exception to this prohibition is
provided when laws of the state in which the bank to be acquired is located specifically author-
ize the acquisition of a state bank by an out-of-state bank holding company. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d) (1982).
3. Congress first granted the Federal Reserve Board the authority to impose limits on the
maximum interest rates payable on time deposits by banks in the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,
§ I 1(b), 48 Stat. 162 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 371b (1982)). Later, similar authority
over rates paid by nonmember insured banks was vested in the Board of Directors of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Act of September 21, 1950, ch. 967, § 218g,
64 Stat. 873, 891 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828q (1982)).
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vant to economic realities.4
While interstate and interest restrictions have yielded to this market
evolution,5 Glass-Steagall still stands as an artificial barrier preventing com-
mercial banks from entering natural markets for bank securities products.
As a result, the profitability and asset quality of commercial banks have seri-
ously declined and their viability as the bulwarks of the nation's financial
and monetary system is in question.6
The fateful consequences posed to the future of the banking system by a
prolongation of Glass-Steagall have led banks and their federal regulators to
appeal to Congress for repeal of the Act.7 Although Congress has turned a
4. For a general discussion of the changing dynamics of the financial services industry,
see Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [here-
inafter Structure and Regulation Hearings].
5. As of September 9, 1987, all but six states had enacted statutes permitting out-of-state
bank holding companies some form of entry. Bank Trigger Dates, Am. Banker, Sept. 9, 1987,
at 15, col. 1. Ceilings on the amount of interest that a bank may pay on deposits were phased
out as a result of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
(1982)). Congress found that interest ceilings "discourage persons from saving money, create
inequities for depositors, impede the ability of depository institutions to compete for funds, and
have not achieved their purpose of providing an even flow of funds for home mortgage lend-
ing." 12 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982).
6. See generally FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, RECENT TRENDS IN COM-
MERCIAL BANK PROFITABILITY: A STAFF STUDY (1986) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL BANK
PROFITABILITY STUDY]. The study attributes the decline in bank profitability, deterioration in
the quality of bank assets, and lagging stock price performance to a series of economic, com-
petitive, and technological changes occuring in the past decade. The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency has attributed this trend in large part to outdated regulatory restraints:
There is a disturbing longer term trend .. .which indicates that profitability and
asset quality may continue to deteriorate. In addition to the sectoral economic
problems, commercial banks face increasingly intense competition. Current laws and
regulations limit the ability of commercial banks to respond to this competition.
I am concerned that unless something is done to give banks additional flexibility to
respond to competitive pressures, there exists the potential for an erosion of the
safety and soundness of the banking system.
Financial Condition of Federally Insured Depository Institutions: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1987) [hereinafter
Financial Condition Hearings] (statement of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency).
Similarly, the Chairman of the FDIC has warned that "[t]he archaic system of laws under
which the banking industry operates has created inefficiencies in the system that are contribut-
ing to some disturbing trends in the banking industry ...." Id. at 22 (statement of L. William
Seidman, Chairman, FDIC).
7. The Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and the Comptroller of the Currency each
have issued studies or public statements questioning Glass-Steagall's relevance in today's finan-
cial marketplace. See generally The Financial Modernization Act of 1987 and the Financial
Services Oversight Act.- Hearings on S. 1886 and S. 1891 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-11 (1987) [hereinafter Greenspan Testi-
mony of Dec. 1, 1987] (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
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deaf ear to similar pleas in the past, key members of Congress are now focus-
ing congressional attention on the need for comprehensive review of the
Glass-Steagall framework. Extensive hearings have been held8 and numer-
ous bills to dismantle Glass-Steagall have been introduced in Congress, in-
cluding the Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988 (S. 1886), which
was passed by the United States Senate on March 30, 1988 by an over-
whelming vote of ninety-four to two.9 Notwithstanding enactment of a tem-
porary congressional moratorium on expanded securities activities' ° and the
Federal Reserve System); Reform of the Nation's Banking and Financial Systems: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-7 (1987) [here-
inafter Greenspan Testimony of Nov. 18, 1987] (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System); Reform of the Nation's Banking and
Financial System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regu-
lation, and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1987) [hereinafter Seidman Testimony of Oct. 28, 1987] (statement of L.
William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC); Reform of the Nation's Banking and Financial Systems:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insur-
ance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-7,
20-21 (1987) [hereinafter Clarke Testimony of Oct. 28, 1987] (statement of Robert L. Clarke,
Comptroller of the Currency); The Structure of the Financial Services Industry: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 6 (1987) [hereinafter Seidman Testimony of Oct. 14,
1987] (statment of L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC); The Structure of the Financial
Services Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Comm on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-18 (1987) [hereinafter
Clarke Testimony of Oct. 14, 1987] (statement of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Cur-
rency); E. CORRIGAN, FINANCIAL MARKET STRUCTURE: A LONGER VIEW (1987); FDIC,
MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY 55-74, 98-102 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Structure and Regulation Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 1-748; see also
HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, MODERNIZATION OF THE FINANCIAL SERV-
ICES INDUSTRY: A PLAN FOR CAPITAL MOBILITY WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF SAFE AND
SOUND BANKING, H.R. REP. No. 324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter BARNARD
REPORT].
9. Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988, S. 1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 134
CONG. REC. S3437 (daily ed. March 30, 1988) [hereinafter S. 1886] (proposed by Sen.
Proxmire and Sen. Garn); see also Financial Services Oversight Act, S. 1891, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987) (proposed by Sen. Wirth and Sen. Graham); Depository Institution Affiliation
Act, S. 1905, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (proposed by Sen. D'Amato and Sen. Cranston);
Depository Institution Affiliation Act, H.R. 3799, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (proposed by
Rep. Barnard); Financial Services Competitive Enhancement Act, H.R. 3837, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987) (proposed by Rep. Ridge); Dual Banking System Enhancement and Financial
Services Competitiveness Act, H.R. 3063, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (proposed by Rep.
Carper); Financial Services Holding Company Act of 1988, H.R. 3360, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (proposed by Rep. Dreier) STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON' BANKING, FINANCE, AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG. 2D SESS., DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS ACT OF 1988 (Comm.
Print 1988) [hereinafter DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS ACT COMMITTEE PRINT] (proposed by
Rep. St Germain and Rep. Wylie).
10. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 201, 101 Stat.
552, 584 [hereinafter CEBA] (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 184 (West Supp. 1988)) imposed a
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setback to reform efforts as a result of "Black Monday,"'" the legislative
groundwork is being laid for the inevitable demise of Glass-Steagall, if not in
the 100th Congress, then in the 101st.
12
Of course, Glass-Steagall's repeal does not mean that banks will be given
carte blanche to expand their securities activities without any limitations."3
Only the most unreconstructed free marketeer would advocate allowing
banks to place depositors' funds at risk by underwriting corporate equities,
at least not without fundamental changes in the federal deposit insurance
system. 14 Rather, what seems more likely is that the separate affiliate con-
cept will be adopted, under which banking organizations could engage in
expanded securities activities only through separately incorporated and op-
erated affiliates, and with restrictions imposed to insulate the banks from
such affiliate activities. This approach, embraced by S. 1886, also would al-
low securities firms to own banks, thereby softening political opposition to
moratorium on new securities activities until March 1, 1988. The moratorium's stated purpose
was to give Congress time "to conduct a comprehensive review of our banking and financial
laws and to make decisions on the need for financial restructuring legislation in the light of
today's changing financial environment both domestic and international before the expiration
of such moratorium." Id. § 203(a). Congress also stated in the CEBA that "[iut is the intent of
Congress not to renew or extend the moratorium . Id. § 203(b). The moratorium was
allowed to expire on March 1, 1988.
11. "Black Monday" is the popular name given to Oct. 19, 1987, the date on which the
Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped a record 508 points. See, e.g., Black Monday, The
Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1987, at A20, col. 1; Stocks Plunge 508 Points, A Drop of 22.6%, 604
Million Volume Nearly Doubles Record, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1987, at Al, col. 6. Senator
Proxmire stated that Black Monday should not dissuade Congress from repealing Glass-Stea-
gall and suggested that the ability of the financial markets to withstand such shocks would be
improved by an increase in the numbers of competitors resulting from commercial banking
organizations entering into the investment banking business. 133 CONG. REC. 16,659 (daily
ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan, echo-
ing the other Federal bank regulators, urged Congress to proceed with legislation repealing
Glass-Steagall, notwithstanding Black Monday. Greenspan Testimony of Dec. 1, 1987, supra
note 7, at 12.
12. While the Senate has approved Glass-Steagall reform legislation in the 100th Con-
gress, the climate in the House for such legislation in the 100th Congress appears more specu-
lative. See Aide, Dingell Stands Firm Against Underwriting, Am. Banker, Mar. 8, 1988, at 9,
col. 2. However, even the securities industry has recognized that Glass-Steagall repeal is inevi-
table. See Horowitz, Glass-Steagall's Demise is Predicted, Am. Banker, Dec. 5, 1986, at 3
(prominent securities industry executives predict the downfall of Glass-Steagall).
13. For example, S. 1886 would repeal only the Glass-Steagall prohibitions on bank affili-
ations and interlocks with securities firms, 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378 (1982), leaving generally
intact Glass-Steagall's limitations on securities activities conducted directly in banks.
14. For instance, H.R. 3837 would allow securities underwriting by banks with less than
$500 million in assets, but only with respect to municipal securities and mutual funds. Finan-
cial Services Competitive Enhancement Act, H.R. 3837, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (pro-
posed by Rep. Ridge).
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Glass-Steagall reform generated by the securities industry.' 5
This Article argues for repeal of Glass-Steagall and examines the separate
affiliate concept as embodied in S. 1886 as a likely model for expanded bank
securities powers in a world without Glass-Steagall. The authors conclude
that the separate affiliate concept, if not rigidly applied, offers a practical
alternative to Glass-Steagall requiring minimal restructuring of the existing
bank and securities regulatory frameworks. At the same time, the concept
addresses the Glass-Steagall concerns of safety, soundness, and conflicts of
interest.
The appendix of this Article surveys the wide range of permissible securi-
ties activities already engaged in by banking organizations. These activities
demonstrate that the traditional Glass-Steagall concerns can be adequately
addressed by regulation, and that within an appropriate framework, banks
and securities firms can operate under the same corporate umbrella consis-
tent with sound banking principles.
I. DISPELLING THE GLASS-STEAGALL MYTHOLOGY
The notion that bank securities activities caused the 1929 stock market
crash and the collapse of the banking system shortly thereafter is a myth
propagated by the securities industry to assure Glass-Steagall a perpetual
life.' 6 If Glass-Steagall is abolished, the myth threatens, the banking system
is destined to repeat those events. 7 These claims ring hollow in light of
securities firms' aggressive efforts to enter banking through the back door by
acquiring "nonbank banks," offering the equivalent of deposits in the form
of cash management accounts, and engaging in other bank-like activities. 8
15. The securities industry has vehemently opposed Glass-Steagall reform short of "com-
plete, two-way" repeal that would grant securities firms the unencumbered ability to own
banks. See The Structure of the Financial Services Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3-4 (1987) [hereinafter Statement of Matthew P. Fink] (written statement of Matthew
P. Fink, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Investment Company Institute).
16. See, e.g., Structure and Regulation Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 397 (statement of
David Silver, President, Investment Company Institute); Statement of Matthew P. Fink, supra
note 15, at 11; Pitt & Williams, History Lessons for Glass-Steagall Reformers, Legal Times,
Feb. 15, 1982, at 38, col. 3.
17. See supra note 16; see also The Structure of the Financial Services Industry: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1987) (statement of Robert A. Gerard, Managing Direc-
tor, Morgan Stanley & Co.).
18. Merrill Lynch, Shearson Lehman, Dreyfus, Prudential Bache, and First Boston Com-
pany are among the numerous securities firms that acquired so-called "nonbank banks" (i.e.,
banks that either accept demand deposits or make commercial loans, but not both). The own-
ership of such banks is grandfathered under the CEBA. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1846 (West Supp.
1988). For a description of money market mutual funds, see discussion at infra note 68.
1988]
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Moreover, the unprecedented October 1987 stock market plunge demon-
strated that stock market stability does not depend on the exclusion of bank-
ing organizations from securities activities. 9
Contrary to the claims of the securities industry, no evidence exists that
the 1929 crash caused the collapse of the banking system or that bank securi-
ties activities caused the failure of a single bank. Indeed, the banking system
collapsed not in 1929 but four years later in 1933. The banking collapse
ultimately was due to general economic conditions exacerbated by tax in-
creases, protectionist trade measures, and a restrictive monetary policy.
20
The Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms appointed to study the
October 1987 stock market events compared the 1987 plunge with that of
1929.21 The Task Force Report did not even hint that bank securities activi-
ties caused the 1929 stock market crash or the banking decline in the 1930's;
furthermore, the report did not mention the Glass-Steagall Act as a signifi-
cant structural distinction between market conditions in 1929 and 1987.22
In fact, the Glass-Steagall prohibitions on commercial bank securities ac-
tivities resulted largely from excessive political efforts to restore public confi-
dence in the banking system following the financial crisis of the early 1930's
and disclosures of abuses in the securities industry generally. Although no
evidence of widespread securities abuses in the banking industry or of a link
19. The stock market decline on October 19, 1987, was more than double the plunge that
caused the 1929 stock market crash. See, e.g., Stock Market Suffers Largest Loss in History As
Dow Industrial Average Drops 508 Points, Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1987, at Al, col. 5; supra note
11. In view of banks' limited involvement in securities activities on October 19 due to Glass-
Steagall prohibitions, the securities industry cannot attribute Black Monday to such activities.
Indeed, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan has noted that the limited effects of the October
stock market volatility on securities firms reinforces the view that the risks of securities activi-
ties can be managed prudently. Greenspan Testimony of Dec. 1, 1987, supra note 7, at 12.
20. See R. AUERBACH, AN APPRAISAL OF BANK FAILURES IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION,
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FINANCIAL-STATISTICAL REPORT 79-1
(1979); M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT CONTRACTION 1929-1933, at 61-63
(1965).
21. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, REPORT, STUDY VIII: A
COMPARISON OF 1929 AND 1987, at VIII-1 (1988).
22. The Report states, "arguing that the [1929] Crash played a leading role in the collapse
of the banking system appears unwarranted .... Indeed, the condition of the banking system
seems to have followed rather than led the decline in the level of real economic activity." Id.
at VIII-3.
[T]he Great Depression appears to have been caused not by the stock market Crash
but by the interaction of a number of diverse circumstances (such as the declines in
agriculture and housing) and misguided policies (such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff,
the tight monetary policy in late 1931 and the tax increase in the summer of 1932).
Thus, as long as a similar set of circumstances and policy initiatives are avoided, a
comparable economic contraction should remain only a remote possibility.
Id. at VIII-10.
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between these abuses and the collapse of banking was ever produced, 2 3 sen-
sational congressional hearings focusing on speculative and manipulative
stock market practices prompted a public outcry for reform measures.2 4
The failure of over 4,000 banks and numerous indictments of bank officials
for fraud during the course of legislative deliberations inflamed public opin-
ion and made banks an easy target for legislative attack.25
In this climate of public hostility toward banks, Senator Carter Glass'
banking philosophy appealed to Congress.26 Glass espoused the so-called
commercial loan or "real bills" theory that banks should be confined to mak-
ing short-term loans to finance the production of goods.27 Glass distrusted
the ordinary investor's wisdom and believed that securities financing dimin-
ished desirable bank control over the allocation of capital.2 8 In Glass' view,
securities activities were inconsistent with a bank's proper role.
Pressed by the urgency of restoring public confidence in the banking sys-
tem and imbued with Senator Glass' banking theories, Congress' response to
alleged abuses resulting from bank involvement in the securities business was
not an attempt to eliminate such abuses by regulation, but rather to separate
"as completely as possible" commercial banking from investment banking.2 9
Congress did this through the four regulatory provisions that comprise the
23. Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan has stated that "research over the past 50 years
concludes, contrary to Congress' view at the time, that bank securities activities were not a
cause of the Great Depression and that banks with securities affiliates did not fail in propor-
tionately greater numbers than banks more generally." Greenspan Testimony of Dec. 1, 1987,
supra note 7, at 13; see also Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1987) (state-
ment of Edward J. Kelly III). Kelly stated that "[t]here is no evidence in the legislative
history that the failure of any large bank was attributable to the underwriting or dealing activi-
ties of its securities affiliates." Id. at 57. Indeed, as Kelly points out, most banks that had
securities affiliates survived the storm of bank failures from 1930 through 1933. Id.
24. See generally S. REP. No. 455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). Although the hearings
exposed some well-publicized misdealings by certain large banks, most of the stock market
abuses involved securities firms not affiliated with banks.
25. See generally H. BURNS, THE AMERICAN BANKING COMMUNITY AND NEW DEAL
BANKING REFORMS, 1933-35 (1974); S. KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933 (1973);
Smith, Glass-Steagall-A History of Its Legislative Origins and Regulatory Construction, 92
BANKING L.J. 38 (1975).
26. WEBSTER'S AMERICAN BIOGRAPHIES 403-04 (C. Van Doren ed. 1974). Architect of
the 1913 Federal Reserve Act and other banking legislation for over a quarter of a century,
Senator Glass was chairman of the subcommittee that drafted the Glass-Steagall Act. As a
former Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, he
wielded considerable power and influence in the Congress. Id.
27. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES
ACTIVITIES 12-15 app. (1975).
28. Id. at 13-14 app.
29. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 70
(1981).
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Glass-Steagall Act. These provisions prohibit banks from underwriting and
dealing in securities or purchasing securities for their own account,30 with
certain exceptions, and prohibit securities firms from accepting deposits.31
Furthermore, Federal Reserve System member banks are not permitted to be
affiliated with any firm that is engaged "principally" in securities underwrit-
ing activities3 2 or to have management interlocks with firms engaged "pri-
marily" in such activities. 3
However, the restoration of banking safety and soundness was brought
about not by enactment of Glass-Steagall, but by the creation of the federal
deposit insurance system and the regulatory reforms introduced in the omni-
bus Banking Act of 1933, 34 of which Glass-Steagall was a small part.
In addition to inflicting losses on millions of depositors and inflaming pub-
lic opinion against bankers, the wave of bank failures exposed fundamental
flaws in the banking system which had contributed to its collapse. 35 Virtu-
ally all of the banks that failed were small, undercapitalized, lacking in di-
versification, and poorly managed. Most of the failed banks were not
30. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(Seventh), 78, 377-378 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 24(Seventh)
of the Glass-Steagall Act provides:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by [a national bank] shall be limited to
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the
order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the
[bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock ....
Id. § 24(Seventh). A national bank is permitted to purchase for its own account investment
securities up to 10% of its capital and to underwrite and deal in certain government securities
and money market instruments. Id.
31. Id. § 378(a)(1). Section 21 of Glass-Steagall makes it unlawful "For any person... or
... organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at
wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving
deposits .... " Id.
32. Id. § 377. Section 20 of Glass-Steagall provides that "no member bank shall be affili-
ated ... with any ... organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting,
public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks,
bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities .... " Id.
33. Id. § 78. Section 32 of Glass-Steagall provides that:
No officer, director, or employee of any [organization] and no individual, primarily
engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale
or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securi-
ties, shall serve the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member
bank ....
Id.
34. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
35. See generally Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hear-
ings on S. Res. No. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1931) [hereinafter 1931 Hearings] (survey of the National and Federal Reserve
Bank systems in order to provide recommendations for legislation to improve the systems'
operation).
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Federal Reserve System members and thus were ineligible for Federal
Reserve emergency advances.36 The power of the Federal Reserve Board
and the Comptroller of the Currency to discipline unsafe banking practices
proved insufficient.37
The Banking Act of 1933 repaired fundamental defects in the banking
system. In addition to establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC),38 the Banking Act of 1933 provided for more rigid control over
capital requirements of federally supervised banks, 39 gave bank regulators
authority to examine affiliates of banks' ° and to remove bank directors who
engaged in unsafe or unsound banking practices,4 imposed restrictions on
transactions between member banks and their affiliates,42 and introduced
other much needed reforms.
At the same time Congress introduced these fundamental structural
changes in the bank regulatory system, it created a securities regulation sys-
tem under the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to restore public
confidence in the stock markets. The Securities Act of 1933 prohibits false
or misleading information in connection with the offer and sale of securi-
ties.43 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) condemns ma-
nipulative practices in the securities markets' and imposes strict regulation
on extensions of credit for the purchase of securities." The Investment
Company Act of 1940,46 enacted shortly thereafter, similarly eliminates
abuses in the mutual fund business. The enactment of this securities regula-
tion system, not Glass-Steagall, was the single most important factor in cur-
tailing abuses in the securities business.
36. Id. at 46. Many failures occurred in outlying rural areas that, with the advent of
automobile travel and new roads, were being served by more competitive in-town banks. Id. at
7, 252, 375. Because of the ban on branch banking in most states, banks that faltered were
forced to terminate in bankruptcy rather than through acquisition by a healthy bank. Id. at
34.
37. See id. at 7, 20, 39. The Comptroller, for example, lacked power to remove bank
officers and had no authority to examine bank security affiliates. Id. at 39.
38. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation originally was established by the Banking
Act of 1933 as part of the Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 324 (1982).
40. Id. § 481.
41. Id. § 248(f).
42. Id. § 371c.
43. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q (1982).
44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78j (1982) [hereinafter Ex-
change Act].
45. Id. § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g.
46. Ch. 686, § 1, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80b-20
(1982)).
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The regulatory frameworks established by these statutory enactments
have proved durable and effective in providing the basis for sound commer-
cial banking institutions and securities firms and guarding against conflicts
of interest, self-dealing, and other abuses.47 In light of the fact that banks
and securities firms face extensive regulation within this framework, the
Glass-Steagall Act is largely superfluous. Indeed, Senator Glass himself ap-
peared to recognize as much. Only two years after the act bearing his name
was enacted, he unsuccessfully sought to amend the Glass-Steagall Act to
permit commercial banks to underwrite corporate securities to a moderate
extent.48
II. DISMANTLING GLASS-STEAGALL
For over fifty years, Glass-Steagall has been a source of conflict between
the commercial banking and investment banking industries. In an attempt
to compete in each other's territory, the industries have assaulted the Act
from both sides. The Glass-Steagall war has been waged intensively for the
past two decades before the banking agencies,49 the courts,50 and Con-
47. The well-publicized indictments of Ivan Boesky and other securities dealers for illegal
insider-trading activities demonstrate that while individuals who disregard the law will always
exist, the securities industry is well policed. See generally Insider Trading: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protections, and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
48. 79 CONG. REC. 11,824-27 (1935) (statement of Sen. Glass). Glass justified his pro-
posed amendment as necessary to create additional underwriting facilities to aid in financing
the faltering heavy goods industries. Although Glass' amendment was approved by the Sen-
ate, it failed to pass the House.
49. The Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC each has
been faced with controversies under the Glass-Steagall Act in recent years. These controver-
sies, which often result in litigation, arise from the securities activities of banking institutions
that the agencies regulate. See infra note 50. See generally Confusion in the Legal Framework
of the American Financial System and Services Industry, Report of the House Subcomm. on
Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
50. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987) (discount brokerage office
of national bank held not to be a branch); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984) (bank holding company discount securities brokerage
activities upheld); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468
U.S. 137 (1984) (third party commercial paper found to be a security for Glass-Steagall pur-
poses); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (FDIC insured bank certificate of deposit
found not to constitute a security subject to antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933);
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46 (1981) (bank
holding company sponsorship of closed-end investment company upheld); Investment Co.
Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (national bank sponsorship of open-end investment com-
pany struck down); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (combined
offerings of securities brokerage and investment advice for bank holding companies' institu-
tional customers upheld); Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
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gress, S! none of which has dealt it a fatal blow. Unlike the Douglas amend-
ment,52 whose death knell was rung by a single United States Supreme Court
decision,$ it will take an act of Congress to finally put Glass-Steagall to rest.
Congress has been able to avoid tampering with Glass-Steagall until now
because there is no grass roots constituency supporting its repeal. Unlike
Regulation Q interest rate ceilings which fell under the weight of consumer
opposition, Glass-Steagall has not attracted voter appeal as a political issue
because consumers do not yet perceive it as directly affecting their pocket-
books.54 On the other hand, the securities industry has staged an intensive
lobbying campaign aimed at preserving its Glass-Steagall monopoly.55 Yet
even the securities industry, while continuing to publicly condemn expanded
bank securities, has recognized that it fights a losing battle.5 6
The consequences of continued congressional inaction to lift the Glass-
Steagall yoke from the banking system should be painfully obvious. The
disastrous results in the thrift industry, caused by artificial regulatory barri-
ers that confined those institutions to a narrow range of financial activities,
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1243 (1987) (FDIC rule allowing securities underwriting activities by state
nonmember banks upheld); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987) (placement of third
party commercial paper found not to be unlawful underwriting); Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
FDIC, No. 84-3875 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (FDIC rule allowing securities underwriting activities by
state nonmember banks upheld); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986) (national bank commingling of IRA accounts upheld).
5 1. For a review of various congressional proposals addressing the need for Glass-Steagall
reform and financial restructuring generally beginning in the 98th Congress, see CHAIRMAN
OF THE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., IST SEss., RESTRUCTURING
FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE MAJOR POLICY ISSUES 109-31 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter
RESTRUCTURING FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE MAJOR POLICY ISSUES].
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
53. The Supreme Court's decision in Northeast Bancorp Inc. v. Board of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985), opened the door to interstate banking by interpret-
ing the interstate restrictions in the Douglas amendment to the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d), in
a manner that allowed states to form regional compacts for interstate banking. Within barely
three years, all but a handful of the states have enacted laws permitting interstate banking to
some extent and many have adopted nationwide banking laws. A contrary interpretation by
the Court would have meant that only Congress could make the decision to allow regional
interstate banking. If that had occurred, a healthy evolution of the banking system might have
been delayed or curtailed to a larger extent.
54. See New Securities Powers for Bank Holding Companies: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1987) (state-
ment of Alan Fox, Legislative Representative, Consumer Federation of America).
55. See Isaac, The Real Reason Glass-Steagall Still Survives, Am. Banker, Apr. 23, 1987,
at 4, col. 2.
56. See Glass-Steagall's Demise is Predicted, Am. Banker, Dec. 5, 1986, at 3, col. I (securi-
ties industry executives acknowledge that Glass-Steagall is a "dinosaur," "Swiss cheese," and a
product of "nostalgia.").
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were a costly lesson.57 That lesson will be repeated if Congress continues to
ignore the technological, economic, and competitive forces shifting the finan-
cial markets away from traditional banking channels toward increased use of
the securities markets for financial intermediation.
The technology revolution has opened up twenty-four hour worldwide fi-
nancial markets linked by instantaneously communicated financial informa-
tion on a global scale.58 This development has made it possible for financial
customers to bypass banks and meet their credit and investment needs di-
rectly and less expensively in the securities markets. By enhancing investor
ability to assess credits and diversify risk without the need for banking ex-
pertise or FDIC protection,59 computer technology has dramatically altered
57. Prior to 1982, thrifts were limited to offering primarily fixed rate long-term home
mortgages funded by deposits subject to a 5.25% interest ceiling. Inflation driven interest rates
in the late 1970's and early 1980's caused massive outflows of funds from thrifts, resulting in a
severe mismatch of assets and liabilities and loss of earnings in the industry. Congress pro-
vided additional asset flexibility and earnings opportunities to thrift institutions in the Thrift
Institutions Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Senate Report on the bill recognized that "defective structuring is
a primary cause of the current economic vulnerability of thrifts," S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1982), and that "the current statutory asset constraints facing thrift institutions
are simply inconsistent with the ability of those institutions to compete in a marketplace char-
acterized by payment of market rates of interest ... it is imperative that thrifts receive asset-
side empowerments capable of generating the earnings needed to support competitive rates."
Id. at 14 (quoting former Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) Chairman Richard
Pratt). The new powers enacted by the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.),
came too late for many thrift institutions. The General Accounting Office's examination of the
Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. (FSLIC) revealed that troubled thrift institutions
caused a net loss of almost $11 billion in the FSLIC fund for 1986 and a deficit of more than $6
billion at the end of 1986. The General Accounting Office concluded that more than $20
billion was needed to assist troubled institutions. Letter from the Comptroller General to the
Chairman of the FHLBB (May 1, 1987), reprinted in Financial Condition of Federally Insured
Depository Institutions: Hearings on S. 198 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1987). The FSLIC's insolvent condition ne-
cessitated congressional enactment of legislation to recapitalize the FSLIC fund with $11 bil-
lion. CEBA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West Supp. 1988).
58. See generally Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Recent Innovations in International
Banking (1986): Hearing on Globalization of Capital Markets By the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
59. On-line data bases, massive computation capacity, and telecommunication facilities
enable investor/lenders to analyze securities issuers' creditworthiness based on instantaneous
credit information. Greenspan Testimony of Nov. 18, 1987, supra note 7, at 4; Greenspan
Testimony of Dec. 1, 1987, supra note 7, at 9. Computerized trading and hedging through the
use of options and futures, including stock index futures introduced in 1982, help managers of
large pension and other investment funds manage investment risks. See generally Implications
of New Technology for Banking Regulation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Gruson, The Global Securities Mar-
ket: Introductory Remarks, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 303.
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the credit evaluation and diversification role of banks that once made them
essential intermediaries. Moreover, increased institutionalization of savings
in the form of pension and retirement plans and the management of these
funds by professional nonbank money managers has diverted vast pools of
funds away from banks to the securities markets.6°
Glass-Steagall's constraining effects have dramatically inhibited the ability
of banks to respond to the evolving financial needs of large corporate cus-
tomers, traditionally the strongest source of profitable banking activity.
Prime corporate customers increasingly are sidestepping banks and satisfy-
ing their short-term and intermediate credit needs by issuing commercial
paper and securitizing their assets. 61 Fifteen years ago, commercial banks
controlled some 90% of the short-term loan market. Today, roughly half of
this market is satisfied through the use of commercial paper. 62 The securi-
tization of assets has reduced the need for bank loans even further. 63 By
packaging automobile loans, leases, consumer loan receivables, and portfo-
lios of other assets into pools, a company can fund its operating costs by
selling interests in the pool directly to investors. 64
Bank loans are being used increasingly as a source of back-up liquidity
60. See generally Gruson, supra note 59, at 303.
61. The Securities Industry Association boasts that securities firms' distribution of com-
mercial paper enabled corporate borrowers to raise funds at costs well below the 250 to 300
basis point spread over costs of funds typically demanded in bank loans. Testimony of Edward
I. O'Brien, President, Securities Industry Association, Before the House Subcomm. on Finan-
cial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Finance (Feb. 2, 1988).
62. See Structure and Regulation Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 124 (statement of Paul
A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System); COMMERCIAL
BANK PROFITABILITY STUDY, supra note 6, at 159-77. The commercial paper market has
more than doubled since 1980, from $31 billion to $78 billion in mid-1987. Structure and Role
of United States Financial Institutions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1987)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System).
63. For example, mortgage pass-through securities accounted for approximately one-third
of all residential mortgage credit in 1987. The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York has stated that, "if securitization were to continue to spread rapidly to other types of
credit, the historic role of the deposit-based credit intermediation process could be seriously
jeopardized." COMMERCIAL BANK PROFITABILITY STUDY, supra note 6, at xvi (foreword by
E. Corrigan).
64. The securitization of assets allows a company to eliminate intermediary expenses in
obtaining funding, transfer credit and interest rate risks, enhance balance sheet liquidity, im-
prove asset management, and diversify credit risk. The asset-backed securities market is ex-
pected to grow to $100 billion in the next five years. Standard & Poor's, Dramatic Growth
Expected, ASSET BACKED SECURITIZATION CREDIT REV., Mar. 16, 1987, at 1. See generally
Pavel, Securitization, Economic Perspectives, 10 FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 16 (1986);
AMERICAN BANKER ASSET SALES REP., Jan. 11, 1988, at 5.
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rather than a primary funding source for many commercial customers. 65
These customers need underwriting and distribution services to facilitate the
sale of their own securities directly in the market. Glass-Steagall precludes
banks from providing these services. While banks have gained limited au-
thority to assist corporate customers in privately placing commercial paper
after a decade-long battle,66 their ability to underwrite commercial paper
and securitized assets has been narrowly circumscribed and is entangled in
ongoing litigation initiated by the securities industry.67
65. See sources cited supra note 64. Although the October 1987 stock market plunge
temporarily boosted the demand for commercial loans as major borrowers fled from the vola-
tile securities markets, the long-term downturn in the commercial loan sector has not changed.
Stock Crisis Could Boost Demand for Loans, Am. Banker, Oct. 30, 1987, at 22, col. 2.
66. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S.
137 (1984); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1987); Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73
Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (1987). See generally FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STAFF, COMMERCIAL
PAPER PRIVATE PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES (1977). Although banks may participate in the
commercial paper market as issuers of standby letters of credit providing back-up liquidity to
issuers whose commercial paper fails to sell in the market, they may not do so with respect to
commercial paper they place under restrictions imposed by the Federal Reserve Board. More-
over, this activity is not a substitute for commercial loans. Id.
67. In 1987, under the BHCA, the Federal Reserve Board approved for the first time
major bank holding companies' applications to engage, through subsidiaries, in underwriting,
and dealing in commercial paper, mortgage backed securities, municipal revenue bonds, and
consumer receivable backed securities. The Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 367
(1987); Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987) [hereinafter Board Order of April 30, 1987];
The Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 607 (1987); Chemical New York Corp., 73
Fed. Res. Bull. 616 (1987); Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 618 (1987); Manufacturers Hanover
Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull 620 (1987); Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 622 (1987); The
Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 729 (1987); Chemical New York Corp., 73 Fed.
Res. Bull. 731 (1987) (CRRs); Marine Midland Banks, Inc., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 738 (1987);
PNC Financial Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 742 (1987); J.P. Morgan & Co., 73 Fed. Res. Bull.
875 (1987); First Interstate Bancorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 928 (1987); Bank of New England
Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 133 (1988). The Board limited such activities to no more than 5% of
each underwriting subsidiary's total gross revenues and limited each to no more than a 5%
share of the market in each type of security. The Board also imposed numerous operating
restrictions on such underwriting subsidiaries, including a prohibition on management inter-
locks with affiliated banks, restrictions on extensions of credit to issuers and purchasers of
securities underwritten by the holding company's subsidiary, and capital adequacy require-
ments. The Board's orders approving the applications have been challenged in court by both
the Securities Industry Association as well as the bank holding company applicants and are the
subject of a judicial stay. See The Chase Manhattan Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., No. 87-1333 (D.C. Cir. filed July 20, 1987); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Nos. 87-4091, 87-4093, 87-4095 (2d Cir. filed July 1 and
July 15, 1987); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-
4041 (2d Cir. filed May 1, 1987); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., No. 87-1169 (D.C. Cir. filed April 17, 1987); Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp. v. Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-1035 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 23, 1987); Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-1030 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan.
20, 1987). On Feb. 8, 1988, the Board's Order of April 30, 1987, was upheld by the United
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Commercial banks not only are constrained by Glass-Steagall in respond-
ing to technological and market changes but are facing increased competi-
tion from nonbank financial institutions in the provision of traditional
banking services. Securities firms and other providers directly supply credit
to traditional banking clients and offer financial instruments that are func-
tionally equivalent to interest-bearing deposits. Volatile interest rates have
created a demand for market sensitive financial instruments and cash man-
agement techniques that nonbank competitors have pioneered in the form of
money market funds, mutual funds, sweep plans, and other nonbanking in-
vestment vehicles that substitute for deposits.68 Although the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 198769 prohibits nonbanking companies from ac-
quiring so-called "nonbank banks," securities firms that acquired such banks
prior to the Competitive Equality Banking Act are permitted to continue
operating them.7°
Glass-Steagall has significantly hindered the ability of banks to keep pace
with these changes and has diminished their role in the financial system. A
recent poll conducted by the American Banker demonstrates the extent to
which banks are losing ground to nonbank financial service providers. Con-
sumers were asked to select which of nine major financial service providers
best meets the typical consumer's financial service need. Thirty-one percent
of the respondents selected Sears Roebuck & Co. while only 7% selected
Citicorp and Citibank.7'
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with the exception of the 5% market limit
which the court struck down. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., No. 87-4041 (2d Cir. Feb. 8, 1988). The Securities Industry Association has filed a
petition for certiorari seeking Supreme Court review of the court's opinion.
68. Money market mutual funds (MMMF's) are functionally equivalent to bank checking
accounts but differ from checking accounts in that they represent an equity interest rather than
credit interest. Unlike bank deposits, MMMF's are not federally insured and are not subject to
insurance premiums or reserve requirements. MMMF's also were not subject to interest'rate
ceilings when such limits were in effect for banks and consequently were able to attract sub-
stantial deposits away from banks. See RESTRUCTURING FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE MAJOR
POLICY ISSUES, supra note 51, at 161, 314-15. The short-term volatility of prices of financial
instruments has been described as "explosive." The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York has stated, "we now see intraday or even intrahour movements in financial asset
prices that not long ago would have been unthinkable." E. CORRIGAN, supra note 7, at 9.
69. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552.
70. See supra note 10. Although the Competitive Equality Banking Act imposes limits on
asset growth and expansion of services by grandfathered nonbank banks and restricts cross-
marketing of their products and services with those of affiliates, grandfathered nonbank banks
have substantial latitude to conduct banking operations. CEBA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843 (West
Supp. 1988).
71. Rosenstein, Consumers Say Sears Best Meets Financial Services Needs, Am. Banker,
Sept. 28, 1987, at 1, col. 2. Other nonbank financial providers were ranked in the poll as
follows: American Express (8%), Merrill Lynch (7%), Prudential Insurance (6%), Beneficial
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United States commercial banks also face increasing competition from for-
eign banks and securities firms as a result of the globalization of financial
markets. These foreign competitors operate in the international markets
unencumbered by Glass-Steagall-type restraints on their activities. While
United States banking organizations operate with fewer restraints abroad
than in the United States, their inability to offer a full range of financial
services domestically has impaired their international competitiveness, and,
with the exception of Citicorp, they no longer rank among the largest bank-
ing organizations worldwide.
As a matter of sound regulatory philosophy, Congress should allow the
banking industry to respond to the natural competitive forces that are shap-
ing the markets unencumbered by regulatory constraints, unless there is evi-
dence that bank securities activities pose insurmountable conflicts of interest,
undermine the stability of the banking system, or threaten other effects inim-
ical to the public interest. Such evidence simply does not exist. To the con-
trary, by confining banks to a narrow range of products and services of
declining profitability, Glass-Steagall threatens the long-term health and sur-
vival of banks as the fulcrum of our financial system.
As a result of losing their most creditworthy commercial loan customers,
banks are making riskier loans at the expense of the overall soundness of the
banking system. 2 The dramatic decline in bank earnings and the lagging
performance of bank stocks in recent years is symptomatic of the systemic
weakness to which Glass-Steagall has contributed." If Congress fails to
broaden the range of profitable business areas for banking organizations, this
trend will have growing destabilizing economic consequences.74 Moreover,
Finance (3%), Fidelity Mutual Funds (2%), and Charles Schwab (1%). The only other bank-
ing organization named in the poll, Bank of America, was selected by 4% of the respondents.
All of the nonbank financial services providers named in the poll, with the exception of Charles
Schwab, own nonbank banks grandfathered under the Competitive Equality Banking Act. Id.
at 44, col. 1.
72. FDIC Chairman Seidman has observed this tendency: "as the result of restrictive
laws, banks have lost a chunk of their traditional business. This has forced banks to go further
out on the risk curve to maintain market share and profit margins." Financial Condition Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 21 (statement of L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC). Comptroller of
the Currency Clarke similarly has expressed concern that, "[u]ntil banks are given greater
competitive flexibility, I am concerned about the potential for a gradual erosion of the safety
and soundness of the banking system." Id. at 9-10 (statement of Robert L. Clarke, Comptrol-
ler of the Currency); see also Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Regulatory Burden Handicaps
Low-Risk Banking, Chicago Fed Letter (Jan. 1988).
73. See generally Financial Condition Hearings, supra note 6; COMMERCIAL BANK PROF-
ITABILITY STUDY, supra note 6.
74. Comptroller of the Currency Clarke has emphasized this danger:
[T]here is a disturbing longer-term trend that indicates that profitability and asset
quality may continue to deteriorate. Current restrictions on banks' ability to diver-
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the Federal Reserve Board has warned that declining bank profitability will
have serious implications for the effectiveness of general monetary policy
and economic stability.7"
III. LIFE WITHOUT GLASS-STEAGALL
In a world without Glass-Steagall, banking organizations would be free to
expand securities activities according to customer needs and marketplace de-
mands rather than remain in artificial statutory limits. Securities firms simi-
larly would be free to operate deposit-taking organizations and offer banking
services.76 Substantial public benefits could be gained from such a deregu-
lated system. Expanded bank securities activities would enhance competi-
tion, increase the availability of services for securities issuers and investors
alike, and reduce the cost of financial transactions generally. Moreover,
these benefits would be felt by both large and small customers.
The corporate securities underwriting market currently is highly concen-
trated with five firms underwriting the vast majority of issues.77 Bank hold-
sify their assets and sources of income make it cumbersome, if not impossible, to
restructure the products and services they offer in line with changing market condi-
tions and consumer demands. Furthermore, only if banks have the authority to de-
liver the products customers demand will they be able to earn returns that can attract
capital.
Financial Conditions Hearings, supra note 6, at 9 (statement of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller
of the Currency).
75. Structure and Regulation Hearings, supra note 4, pt. I, at 121-22 (statement of Paul
A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). The commercial
banking system is the mechanism through which monetary policy seeks to influence overall
economic activity, the custodian of the bulk of liquid assets, the operator of the payments
system, and the principal source of back-up liquidity. For these reasons, the Central Bank
claims that the viability of the banking system is essential to the stability of the economic and
financial system generally.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which conducts a large part of the Federal Reserve
System's monetary policy operations, has stressed the importance of the link between mone-
tary policy and the banking system: "To the extent that monetary policy operates through its
influence on the narrow money supply and/or on interest rates, the crucial importance of
banks is obvious and indeed is enshrined in every textbook of money and banking as well as
every text on macroeconomic theory." COMMERCIAL BANK PROFITABILITY STUDY, supra
note 6, at 1; see also Structure and Regulation Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 121 (statement
of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
76. Securities firms have pointed out, however, that repeal of Glass-Steagall will not result
in a "two-way street" unless the BHCA also is amended to enable them to continue certain
nonbanking activities, such as insurance and real estate. See Structure and Regulation Hear-
ings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 416-18 (statement of David Silver, President, Investment Company
Institute).
77. The five largest underwriters of commercial paper account for over 90% of the mar-
ket; the five largest underwriters of all domestic corporate debt account for almost 70% of the
market. See BARNARD REPORT, supra note 8, at 85-91.
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ing company entry into this market can be expected to increase competition,
lower concentration levels, and reduce funding costs for business.78
Similarly, expanded bank authority to underwrite municipal s~curities
would result in savings for state and local governments and thereby for local
taxpayers who ultimately bear the cost of municipal borrowing. 79 The intro-
duction of banking competitors also can be expected to benefit smaller and
infrequent issuers that currently have a limited choice of underwriters.80
Bank underwriting of mortgage-backed securities also would enhance com-
petition in that market and increase the available funding sources used to
support the housing market.8 '
Expanded bank securities brokerage services would provide substantial
benefits to retail investors. Until recently, banks and bank holding compa-
nies could offer combined securities brokerage and investment advice only to
institutional and wealthy individual customers.8 2  Legislation repealing
Glass-Steagall and establishing clear authority for banking organizations to
offer full-service brokerage services would preclude the need for litigation
and ensure the availability to retail brokerage customers of bank investment
advisory services currently available only to wealthy customers. Further-
78. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) has supported Glass-Steagall re-
form as a means of lowering the cost to manufacturers of raising funds. NAM Policy State-
ment of Feb. 5, 1988, reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S1581 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1988) (statement
of Sen. Garn).
79. Expanded bank municipal securities underwriting activities have long been supported
by associations of state and municipal governments, including the National Governors Associ-
ation and the National League of Cities. See Board Order of April 30, 1987, supra note 67;
New Securities Powers for Bank Holding Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1987) [hereinafter New Secur-
ities Powers Hearings] (statement of Richard B. Geltman, Staff Director, National Association
of Governors); id. at 66 (statement of Richard Guthman, National League of Cities).
80. See Board Order of April 30, 1987, supra note 67.
81. National trade associations of home builders and realtors have supported bank hold-
ing company entry into the mortgage-backed securities underwriting business as a means of
developing a strong private secondary market for mortgage securities. See, e.g., New Securities
Powers Hearings, supra note 79, at 38-39 (statement of Stan H. Sabin, Chair, Real Estate Fi-
nance Committee, National Association of Realtors); id. at 44-45 (statement of Kent Colton,
National Association of Home Builders).
82. National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584, 584 n. 1 (1986), petition for
review denied sub nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 56 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1988); see also J.P.
Morgan & Co., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 810 (1987); Manufacturer's Hanover Corp., 73 Fed. Res.
Bull. 930 (1987). The application by Bank of New England Corporation to provide combined
securities brokerage and investment advisory services for retail coustomers is expected to be
approved by the Federal Reserve Board in May, 1988. The Comptroller of the Currency's
Office has allowed national banks to offer combined discount securities brokerage and invest-
ment advisory services to retail customers. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 386, [Current] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,610, at 77,932-33 (July 24, 1987).
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more, the ability of banks to securitize loans on their books and sell them to
investors will result in new sources of liquidity, greater flexibility in respond-
ing to loan demand and interest rate fluctuations, and increased return on
equity. 
3
As the appendix to this Article indicates, banking organizations already
offer their customers a wide range of securities products and services within
existing Glass-Steagall parameters. These services include discount broker-
age, commingled individual retirement accounts, private placements, invest-
ment advice, and underwriting of government securities. These bank
securities activities have enhanced competition in the securities industry and
given both wholesale and retail customers increased access to financial serv-
ices at greater convenience and reduced costs. Furthermore, these public
benefits have been achieved without giving rise to unfair competition, con-
flicts of interest, or unsafe and unsound practices. Bank regulators have uti-
lized the existing bank supervisory structure to fashion appropriate
regulatory restrictions, establish guidelines for expanded securities activities,
and monitor compliance with these regulations. Moreover, United States
banking organizations actively engage in foreign securities underwriting and
dealing activities that are not authorized domestically. The foreign invest-
ment banking experience of these organizations has been viewed favorably
by United States banking regulators.8 4
It is clear that banking is inherently more risky than it was in 1933, while
the securities business is safer.8 5 The relative risks, for example, of making a
thirty year fixed-rate loan should be obvious when compared to holding
short-term commercial paper for thirty minutes in an underwriting. Con-
83. Aber, Securitization: Promise and Opportunity for Lenders, 2 COM. LENDING REV. 21
(Fall 1987); Annable, Will All Banks Be Securitized Someday?, 2 CoM. LENDING REV. 3 (Fall
1987); Bank Attracts Cheap Funds With Offering, Am. Banker, Mar. 8, 1988, at 2, col. 4. The
Comptroller of the Currency has authorized national banks to sell their own securitized assets
but such activities are the subject of a legal challenge by the Securities Industry Association
under the Glass-Steagall Act. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 388, [Current] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,612, at 77,938 (June 16, 1987) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive Letter No. 388]
(letter of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of Currency).
84. Greenspan Testimony of Dec. 1, 1987, supra note 7, at 13.
85. The Comptroller of the Currency, referring to underwriting revenue bonds, managing
mutual funds, purchasing security interests in loan pools, and other new activities, has noted
that many of the new activities involve less risk than activities that are part of commercial
banking's established practices. Financial Condition Hearings, supra note 6, at 6 (statement of
Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency); see also Structure and Regulation Hearings,
supra note 4, pt. 3, at 30 (statement of James J. Baechle, Executive Vice President and General
Counsel, Bankers Trust Company). Baechle stated that underwriting corporate securities is
inherently far less risky than lending because underwriting risk is brief, more easily hedged,
and simpler to liquidate than loans. Id.
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
gress should worry more about the risks to the banking system of failing to
repeal Glass-Steagall than the risks of repeal.
The ability of banking organizations to offer diverse financial products and
services in step with changing market demands is critical to their ability to
remain profitable and attract capital. The average return on securities activi-
ties in recent years has exceeded the average return on commercial banking
activities.16 Increased flexibility for banking organizations to participate in
more profitable securities product markets can be expected to increase signif-
icantly banking organizations' earnings. Moreover, economies of scale and
product synergies resulting from combined commercial and investment
banking activities would achieve cost savings.8 7 The increased diversifica-
tion of assets resulting from repeal of Glass-Steagall also would reduce the
tendency to take on riskier loans and reduce bank vulnerability to failure,
thereby enhancing overall banking stability.8 8
A. The Separate Affiliate Concept
While several alternatives for Glass-Steagall's repeal are conceivable, not
all are practical or politically feasible.8 9 The separate affiliate concept offers
the most realistic approach to Glass-Steagall's repeal and could, with a mini-
mum of restructuring, be accomplished within the existing regulatory frame-
work. Such an approach would mandate that all bank securities activities,
other than those deemed acceptable for banks, be conducted in non-FDIC-
86. The average after-tax return on equity for investment banks during 1980-84 was 26%
compared to 12.2% for commercial banking institutions. COMMERCIAL BANK PROFITABIL-
ITY STUDY, supra note 6, at 372.
87. Greenspan Testimony of Dec. 1, 1987, supra note 7, at 5-6.
88. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has recognized that profitable new activities
"could support the overall profitability of bank holding companies during periods of weakness
in the profitability of traditional banking. Moreover, by improving credit ratings, they could
lower the cost of funding bank intermediation, thus enhancing its profitability." COMMERCIAL
BANK PROFITABILITY STUDY, supra note 6, at 6.
89. For example, under one approach, the price for freedom from Glass-Steagall could be
allocated according to the riskiness of an individual bank organization's activities by propor-
tionate increases in deposit insurance premiums paid by banks. However, such an alternative
would require fundamental changes in the deposit insurance system, and would raise thorny
questions as to how risk should be measured and by whom. See Structure and Regulations
Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 3 app. E, at 390 (An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for Deposit
Insurance Reform appendix prepared by Thomas F. Huertas and Rachel Strauber). The Fi-
nancial Services Oversight Act, S. 1891, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), and the Financial Serv-
ices Holding Company Act of 1988, H.R. 3360, 100th Cong., ist Sess. (1987), suffer from the
same disability of requiring major structural changes in banking regulation. Such proposals
are likely to ignite turf battles among the existing banking agencies, which could be fatal to
legislative repeal of Glass-Steagall.
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insured affiliates separated from the deposit-taking function and the federal
safety net by appropriate safeguards.
The theory is based on several premises stemming from the belief that
banks need special regulatory supervision and protection in view of their role
as the custodians of the bulk of society's liquid assets, the operators of the
payments system, the back-up source of liquidity to the financial system, and
a primary means of transmitting monetary policy to the economy. 90 Be-
cause banks are the beneficiaries of the federal safety net, particularly federal
deposit insurance and the Federal Reserve discount window serving as a
lender of last resort, it is believed that banks should not directly engage in
risky activities that cannot be regulated effectively and that would place an
undue supervisory and insurance burden on the federal government. 9 Simi-
larly, the unique status of banks is said to give them a competitive advantage
over nonbank financial institutions lacking access to FDIC-insured deposits
to fund their operations.92 Furthermore, because of their custody of the
enormous pool of public deposits, banks are perceived to be susceptible to
potential conflicts of interest.
The separate affiliate concept addresses these concerns by creating a le-
gally separate organization to engage in activities deemed inappropriate for
banks. Through a separate organization, it is possible to minimize exposure
of the bank's insured deposits to risks deemed unacceptable, avoid the use of
insured deposits in competition with nonbanking institutions, and guard
against potential conflicts of interest.93 Moreover, the separate affiliate con-
cept provides a politically palatable alternative to Glass-Steagall that can be
enacted without major structural changes in the existing bank regulatory
system.9 4
The concept has already been utilized in several regulatory contexts au-
thorizing banking institutions to engage in permissible securities activities,
90. Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REP. 5, 7
(1982).
91. See Moratorium Legislation and Financial Institutions Deregulation: Hearings on S.
1532, S.1609, and S. 1682 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1983) (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary, U.S. Department of
the Treasury).
92. 1d.; Greenspan Testimony of Dec. 1, 1987, supra note 7, at 18.
93. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK POWERS: INSULATING
BANKS FROM THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF EXPANDED ACTIVITIES (1987) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
94. The BHCA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982), provides an existing framework for se-
curities activities regulation conducted in separate holding company subsidiaries. Similarly,
regulations of the federal banking agencies allow banks to establish operating subsidiaries to
engage in permissible securities activities. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34, 250.141, 337.4 (1987).
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notably in the FDIC's "bona fide subsidiary" rule95 and the Federal Reserve
Board's orders approving bank holding company applications to engage in
limited securities underwriting activities through separate affiliates.96 In ad-
dition, several of the pending legislative proposals to repeal Glass-Steagall
substantially, including the Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988,
embrace this concept 97
B. The Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988
The Proxmire Financial Modernization Act (S. 1886), as approved by the
Senate on March 30, 1988, creates a framework for expanded securities ac-
tivities of banking organizations utilizing the separate affiliate concept.9"
The bill would repeal the section 20 and section 32 Glass-Steagall restric-
tions on affiliations and interlocks between member banks and securities
firms99 and amend the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) to authorize
specifically bank holding companies to establish securities affiliates. "
A securities affiliate would be authorized to engage in underwriting, dis-
tributing, or dealing in securities of any type, including corporate debt and
equity securities and mutual funds. 101 A securities affiliate also could engage
in securities brokerage, private placement, investment advisory, and other
securities activities permissible for SEC-registered broker-dealers.' 0 2 Activi-
ties of banks affiliated with securities affiliates would be limited10 3 and strict
"firewalls" imposed to insulate the banks from the affiliate's activities.
95. 12 C.F.R. § 337.4(b)(ii) (1987).
96. See, e.g., Board Order of April 30, 1987, supra note 67, at 473.
97. Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988, S. 1886, supra note 9.
98. S. Rep. No. 305, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S3360-3437 (daily ed. March
30, 1988).
99. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 101.
100. The bill would add a new § 4(c)(15) to the BHCA incorporating the new powers for
securities affiliates. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 102.
101. S. 1886 provides that activities with respect to corporate equities may not be com-
menced prior to congressional approval, on or before April 1, 1991, of a joint resolution specif-
ically authorizing such activities. Id. In addition, activities with respect to mutual funds and
unsecured corporate debt securities with a maturity of one year or more at time of issuance are
not authorized until six months following the date of enactment of the bill. Id.
102. Id. A securities affiliate also could engage in nonsecurities activities that are otherwise
permissible under § 4 of the BHCA. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 102. In addition, a bank holding
company could engage, pursuant to § 4(c)(8) of the BHCA, in securities activities other than
underwriting, distribution, and dealing in bank ineligible securities. Such § 4(c)(8) activities
would not be subject to the firewall provisions applicable to securities affiliates approved under
§ 4(c)(15).
103. The bill prohibits a bank or FSLIC-insured institution affiliated with a securities affili-
ate from engaging directly or indirectly in underwriting, distributing, or dealing in securities
except to the extent specifically authorized by statute for a national bank or by regulation
promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency before November 18, 1987. S. 1886, supra
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The firewalls imposed by S. 1886 include the following restrictions on cap-
ital adequacy, extensions of credit, and other relationships between securities
affiliates and affiliated banks:
1. Capital Adequacy
S. 1886 would prohibit a bank holding company from acquiring control of
a section 4(c)(15) affiliate if the acquisition would reduce the bank holding
company's capital below the minimum level required for bank holding com-
panies. " S. 1886 requires a bank holding company that invests in a securi-
ties affiliate to maintain a capital cushion above the minimum capital
requirements for bank holding companies and prevents a bank holding com-
pany from "double leveraging" its investment without maintaining addi-
tional capital. 15 In order to promote functional regulation and competitive
equity, the securities affiliate itself would be subject to the same SEC capital
standards that apply to securities firms unaffiliated with banks. 106
2. Extensions of Credit
Under S. 1886, no bank or insured institution affiliated with a securities
affiliate may, directly or indirectly:
a. "extend credit in any manner to the securities affiliate or a subsidiary
thereof," except for intraday extensions of credit incidental to the clearing of
transactions in United States government securities;
b. "purchase for its own account financial assets of the securities affiliate
or a subsidiary thereof";
note 9, §§ 102, 104. Underwriting and distributing of securitized assets originated or
purchased by the bank or its affiliates is specifically prohibited. Id.
104. However, the capital requirements imposed by S. 1886 would not apply to the extent
that the Federal Reserve Board determined by order that an item relates to activities other
than underwriting and the other activities enumerated in proposed § 4(c)(15) as permissible
securities activities.
105. In calculating capital for regulatory purposes, a bank holding company would be re-
quired to subtract from its total capital and total assets an amount equal to the sum of (1) its
equity investment in a securities affiliate, and (2) its extensions of credit that are considered
capital of the securities affiliate for securities law purposes. Id. § 102. As a result, each dollar
a bank holding company contributed to a securities affiliate's capital would result in a one-
dollar reduction in the holding company's capital.
106. S. 1886 does this by providing that the assets and liabilities of a § 4(c)(15) shall not be
consolidated with those of the parent bank holding company and that the bank holding com-
pany's total assets and total liabilities shall each be reduced by an amount equal to the amount
of the bank holding company's extensions of credit to any § 4(c)(l 5) affiliate, excluding exten-
sions of credit treated as capital for SEC purposes. See 15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986);
17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1 (1987). Thus, a securities affiliate would be required to raise capital to
support funds loaned by its parent or raised from sources other than the parent holding com-
pany, but such funding would not result in an increase in the parent's capital requirements.
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c. "issue a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit, including an en-
dorsement or a standby letter of credit, for the benefit of the securities affili-
ate or a subsidiary thereof";
d. "extend credit in any manner to any investment company advised by
or the shares of which are distributed by the securities affiliate";
e. "extend credit or other instruments for the purpose of enhancing the
marketability of a securities issue underwritten or distributed by the securi-
ties affiliate";
f. "extend credit to an issuer of securities underwritten by the securities
affiliate for the purpose of paying the principal of those securities or interest
or dividends on those securities";
g. "extend or arrange for the extension of credit, directly or indirectly,
secured by or for the purpose of purchasing any security while, or for 30
days after, a distribution in which a securities affilliate ... participates as an
underwriter or a member of a selling group." This restriction applies to the
parent bank holding company and any of its subsidiaries in addition to bank
subsidiaries.10 7
3. Interlock Restrictions
Furthermore, S. 1886 would prohibit an officer or director of a securities
affiliate from serving at the same time as an officer or director of any affili-
ated bank or FSLIC-insured institution."l 8 This prohibition would not ap-
ply to bank holding companies with total banking assets of not more than
$500 million (adjusted annually). In addition, the Federal Reserve Board
would be authorized to grant exemptions based on factors including size,
burden, safety and soundness, unfair competition, and improper exchange of
nonpublic customer information.I°9
4. Disclosure
a. Separateness
A securities affiliate would be required to disclose prominently in writing
to each of its customers that the affiliate is not a bank or FSLIC-insured
institution and is separate from any affiliated bank or insured institution.110
b. Non-FDIC Insured Status
A similar disclosure would be required detailing that securities sold, of-
107. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 102.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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fered, or recommended are not deposits insured by the FDIC or FSLIC, are
not guaranteed by an affiliated bank or insured institution, and are not other-
wise an obligation of such a bank or insured institution.'
c. Securities Dealt in by Affiliates
A bank or FSLIC-insured institution would be required to disclose to cus-
tomers that a securities affiliate is underwriting, distributing, or dealing in
any securities on which the bank or insured institution expresses an opinion
as to value or advisability of purchasing or selling." 2
d. Nonpublic Customer Information
A bank or insured institution would be prohibited from disclosing to a
securities affiliate any nonpublic customer information without the cus-
tomer's consent, and vice versa.
1 3
5. Securitized Assets of Affiliates
S. 1886 also prohibits a securities affiliate from underwriting or distribut-
ing securitized assets originated by an affiliated bank, FSLIC insured institu-
tion, or subsidiary thereof unless those securities are rated by an unaffiliated,
nationally recognized statistical rating organization."' This restriction
would not apply to dealing in such securitized assets.
C. Avoiding a Rigid Structure
The firewall and other provisions of S. 1886 demonstrate that appropriate
safeguards can be constructed to insulate banks from the securities activities
of affiliates and thereby address concerns regarding safety and soundness,
conflicts of interest, unfair competition, and concentration of resources. In-
deed, virtually all of the firewall provisions in S. 1886 are borrowed from the
Federal Reserve Board's orders approving limited securities underwriting
activities by bank holding companies.'"
While these extensive restrictions may be appropriate in a regulatory
framework crafted by bank regulators as the initial step toward phasing in
expanded securities powers, however, it would be a mistake for Congress to
carve them into stone without affording a regulatory mechanism to modify
the restrictions as time and experience prove appropriate. Moreover, unless
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Board Order of April 30, 1987 and cases cited supra note 67.
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Congress makes clear that these restrictions are maximum strictures, the
regulators may be subjected to pressure by competitors of bank holding com-
panies to impose stricter conditions than those deemed necessary by
Congress.1
16
If the separate affiliate approach is applied too rigidly, it will defeat the
benefits of expanded securities powers. Joint accounting, data processing,
and other administrative services between a securities affiliate and affiliated
banks, for example, do not give rise to any conflicts of interest or other con-
cerns and could result in synergistic benefits that would benefit a banking
organization as a whole. S. 1886 does not prohibit such joint services and
would allow such benefits to be realized.
Moreover, cross-marketing arrangements between banks and their affili-
ates could be structured in such a way as to maintain effective insulation of
the bank without sacrificing the benefits of synergy between the two. The
sale by a securities affiliate of securitized assets of affiliated banks, for exam-
ple, should raise no greater concerns than when the bank directly sells such
assets, an activity that the Comptroller of the Currency has found to be
permissible for national banks." 7 S. 1886 does not prohibit bank securities
affiliates from cross-marketing services and underwriting securitized assets
of affiliated banks if those assets are rated by an unaffiliated nationally recog-
nized rating agency." 8 Congress should make clear that the Federal Re-
serve Board may not prohibit such activities using its regulatory authority
under the Bank Holding Company Act, as it did in approving limited under-
writing activities for bank holding companies." 9
116. The Federal Reserve Board, for example, in considering bank holding company appli-
cations or notices to engage in securities activities, would be required to apply the same balanc-
ing test currently applicable under § 4(c)(8) of the BHCA. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 203. The
test considers whether the proposed activity "can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to
the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that out-
weigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1982). The Board may attempt to utilize this authority to impose conditions stricter than
those deemed necessary by Congress. Nonbank competitors protesting bank holding company
applications in the past have successfully urged the Board to apply this test in a restrictive
manner. S. 1886 limits the ability of protesters to influence the Board's consideration of bank
holding company applications in the future by substituting a notice procedure for the current
application procedure. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 203. The notice procedure would become
effective for § 4(c)(15) activities, however, only after four years from the date of enactment of
S. 1886.
117. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 388, supra note 83, at 77,938-46.
118. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 102.
119. See Board Order of April 30, 1987, supra note 67, at 504. The Board prohibited
underwriting subsidiaries of bank holding companies from underwriting securitized assets of
affiliated banks. Id.
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Excessive regulatory separation requirements would impose prohibitive
legal, administrative, personnel, and other costs that would deter banking
organizations, particularly small and regional organizations, from diversify-
ing into new securities markets. For example, a prohibition that prevents
holding company officers and directors from serving as officers and directors
of both a securities affiliate and a subsidiary bank would impose duplicative
personnel costs and could impair the ability of a bank holding company to
effectively manage its subsidiaries. Although a large banking organization
may have no difficulty in finding replacement personnel for the bank, a
smaller firm may not have the resources to hire duplicative personnel. Fur-
thermore, a rigid insulation policy could deny securities affiliates the benefits
of experience and expertise acquired by affiliated banks that would be benefi-
cial, particularly in the start-up phase, to the securities affiliate. On the
other hand, bank management may suffer if bank officers engaged in securi-
ties activities are transferred to a securities affiliate. It would not be unrea-
sonable for a bank officer who manages a bank's government securities
activities to act in a similar capacity with respect to a securities affiliate.
Such an interlock is permissible under current law, and should not be pro-
hibited by new law.
S. 1886 recognizes potential burdens on small and regional organizations
by exempting from the interlock prohibitions bank holding companies with
banking assets of $500 million or less and authorizing the Federal Reserve
Board to grant further exemptions. 120 The Committee report states that the
Board is expected to grant exemptions for small and regional bank holding
companies when the services of key personnel are crucial to both the securi-
ties affiliate and the bank.12 1
The Board should be given similar authority to grant limited exemptions
from the other restrictions in S. 1886 under appropriate circumstances.
Congress should leave to bank regulators some discretion to determine, con-
sistent with safe and sound principles, the degree of separation necessary for
maximum efficiency and profitability of the banking system. The feasibility
of various restrictions may be affected by competition, new product develop-
ments, or other economic or technological changes affecting the market. Ex-
perience with new activities may demonstrate over time that lesser degrees of
separation are appropriate. For example, the FDIC, has determined that
certain regulatory restrictions it imposed to force a separation between state
nonmember banks and their securities affiliates are overbroad and has re-
120. The Board is required to consider the size of the institution involved, any burdens that
may be imposed by a prohibition on interlocks, the safety and soundness of the institutions,
and other appropriate factors. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 102.
121. S. REP. No. 305, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1988).
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laxed them.'22 Similarly, some of the Federal Reserve Board's restrictions
on limited securities underwriting activities for bank holding companies re-
flect an overcautious attitude that the Board has stated it will relax as it
gains experience with the new activities.1 23
Regulatory caution is understandable hs Congress and the agencies take
their initial steps in authorizing new securities activities, particularly in the
face of vigorous opposition from the securities industry. However, the agen-
cies' flexibility to modify the restrictions as banking organizations develop a
record of experience with the new powers should not be eliminated by incor-
porating overly rigid statutory restrictions.
D. Flexibility for Bank Activities
The separate affiliate concept does not necessarily require expanded secur-
ities activities to be lodged in a separate affiliate of the parent bank holding
company, as opposed to a bank subsidiary. The FDIC's "bona fide subsidi-
ary" rule demonstrates that it is feasible to insulate effectively a bank from
the activities of a subsidiary as well as from a holding company affiliate.124
Strengthening the banking system by increasing the profitability of banking
organizations is one of the fundamental purposes of Glass-Steagall reform
afterall. Therefore, banks should be allowed to profit directly from their
subsidiaries' expanded securities activities rather than allocating such profits
only to the parent holding company. Moreover, approximately one-third of
all banks chartered in the United States are not affiliated with holding com-
panies. These banks should not be forced to incur the organizational and
regulatory costs of forming holding companies in order to take advantage of
expanded securities powers.1 25
S. 1886 does not adopt this view and generally would prohibit FDIC-in-
sured banks from affiliating with any company engaged in securities activi-
ties other than a securities affiliate under the BHCA. 126 Although S. 1886
122. Under the FDIC's initial rule, state nonmember banks' securities subsidiaries that are
regulated by the FDIC were required to maintain separate entrances, locations, names, and
logos from their banking affiliates. 12 C.F.R. § 337 (1987). These requirements were signifi-
cantly curtailed by the revised rule, provided that the securities affiliates make certain disclo-
sures to customers regarding their separate, non-FDIC-insured status. Unsafe and Unsound
Banking Practices, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,379 (1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 337).
123. For instance, the Board has announced that it will consider raising the volume limit
on securities underwriting activities from 5% of gross revenues to 10%. Board Order of April
30, 1987, supra note 67, at 485.
124. Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices, 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 (1987).
125. See, e.g., Seidman Testimony of Oct. 28, 1987, supra note 7, at 7-9 (testifying in favor
of expanded securities activities conducted in a bank subsidiary).
126. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 107. This restriction would not apply to an affiliate engaged in
underwriting and dealing in solely government securities, municipal revenue bonds, and other
[Vol. 37:281
Glass-Steagall
establishes expedited simplified procedures for the establishment of shell
one-bank holding companies, these procedures are not available if the com-
pany will engage in nonbanking activities after the company is formed. 12
7
Not all securities activities pose increased risks or potential conflicts of
interest for banks. For example, underwriting of municipal revenue bonds,
mortgage-backed and consumer receivable-backed securities, and other
securitized bank assets are similar to activities currently permissible for
banks under Glass-Steagall and would be appropriate for banks to engage in
directly. Other appropriate activities for banks would include the underwrit-
ing of unit investment trusts that invest only in securities in which a national
bank is authorized to underwrite and the distribution of mutual funds that
are not organized, sponsored, or managed by the bank or any of its
affiliates. '
28
Congress should not use the separate affiliate concept as an excuse to pre-
clude bank participation in all securities activities. As the appendix to this
Article demonstrates, banks currently engage in a wide range of permissible
securities activities without giving rise to conflicts of interest or safety and
soundness concerns. Thus, banks should not be denied the benefits of new
securities activities that they can conduct safely.
S. 1886 would provide a limited expansion of national bank securities
powers by specifically authorizing such banks to underwrite and deal in mu-
nicipal revenue bonds.129 In addition, S. 1886 authorizes two new securities
activities for national banks that are not affiliated with securities affiliates.
Such banks may underwrite securities of a unit investment trust 13 ° that
holds only securities that national banks are specifically authorized by stat-
ute to underwrite and may distribute shares of an investment company that
is not organized, sponsored, managed, or controlled by the bank or any affili-
ate thereof.131
S. 1886 narrows the securities powers of national banks that are affiliated
with securities affiliates by requiring the transfer to a securities affiliate of
certain activities recognized as permissible by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, but not recognized specifically by statute.132 Thus, such an affiliated
securities authorized by statute or Comptroller of the Currency regulation promulgated before
Nov. 18, 1987, for national banks to underwrite.
127. Id. § 201.
128. See H.R. 3837, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (introduced by Rep. Ridge).
129. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 108.
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(2) (1982) (defining a current investment trust).
131. Id. State member banks would gain identical powers by virtue of 12 U.S.C. § 335
(1982), which subjects them to the same restrictions on securities activities that apply to na-
tional banks under 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (Supp. IV 1986).
132. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 102.
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national bank would lose its current authority to underwrite mortgage-
backed securities and other securitized assets. A national bank not so affili-
ated could continue to engage in such activities.1 33
E. Existing Regulatory Safeguards
In addition to the protections established by S. 1886, existing laws and
regulations safeguard banks from possible adverse effects arising from securi-
ties activities directly conducted by banks or their affiliates. Furthermore,
these laws provide ample regulatory authority for banking supervisors to
impose protective measures as needed.1 34
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act1 35 limits extensions of credit,
purchases of assets, and other transactions between an FDIC-insured bank
and its nonbank affiliates.1 36 Covered transactions with a single affiliate may
not exceed 10% of the bank's capital and surplus. Furthermore, such trans-
actions with all affiliates may not exceed 20% of the bank's capital and sur-
plus. A bank may not purchase any low-quality asset from an affiliate, other
than a bank affiliate, and all transactions must be on terms and conditions
consistent with safe and sound banking practices.1 37
Similarly, section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act 38 requires that transac-
tions between a bank and its affiliates be on terms and conditions, including
credit standards, that are substantially the same as or at least as favorable to
the bank as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with
unaffiliated companies. These "arm's length" requirements apply to transac-
tions involving the sale of assets to an affiliate as well as the purchase of
assets from an affiliate for the affiliates' benefit.'
39
133. Nonmember FDIC-insured banks would be similarly affected. Id. Affiliates of such
banks would be subject to limitations similar to those under the proposed § 4(c)(1 5) of the
BHCA.
134. See generally The Financial Modernization Act of 1987 and the Financial Services
Oversight Act: Hearings on S. 1886 and S. 1891 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987) (statement of George D. Gould, Under-
secretary of Finance, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
135. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982).
136. Id. § 371c(a).
137. Id. Although § 23A does not apply to transactions between a bank and its direct
subsidiaries, the Federal Reserve Board has authority to apply § 23A limits to such transac-
tions if the Board determines that the action is necessary to avoid detriment to the bank or its
subsidiary. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(E) (1982).
138. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-! (1982), amended by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987, 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c-l (West Supp. 1988).
139. Id. § 371c-l(a)(2), (3). Transactions covered by § 23B include any transaction in
which an affiliate acts as an agent or broker or receives a fee for its services to the bank or any
other person and any transaction or series of transactions with a third party if an affiliate has a
financial interest in the third party, or if an affiliate is a participant in the transaction. Id.
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National banks are subject to restrictions on the amount of loans that may
be extended to a single borrower. Such loans may not exceed 15% of a
bank's unimpaired capital and surplus, plus an additional ten percent if the
additional amount is secured by readily marketable collateral. " Although
the statutory limits do not apply to direct subsidiaries of national banks, the
Comptroller of the Currency has applied the limits to such subsidiaries on a
case-by-case basis. 141
Federal law restricts extensions of credit by an insured bank to insiders of
the bank or its affiliates,14 2 and prohibits a bank from purchasing securities
or other property from any of its directors unless the purchase is on an arm's
length basis in the regular course of business or a majority of the board of
directors approves the purchase. 143 Similar restrictions apply to the sale of
securities by a bank to its directors. 1 These limitations have proven effec-
tive in minimizing fraud and insider abuse in the banking industry. 14 5
The extensive bank supervision and surveillance system enables banking
regulators to monitor closely the securities activities of banking organiza-
tions through periodic examinations and reporting requirements."' Each of
Section 23B also prohibits a bank or its affiliates from advertising or suggesting in any way that
the bank is responsible for its affiliates' obligations. Id. § 371c-1(c). Moreover, § 23B prohib-
its a bank from purchasing as a fiduciary any securities or other assets from any affiliate. This
prohibition includes an investment company advised by an affiliate, unless specifically author-
ized by the fiduciary instrument, court order, or appropriate law. Id. § 371c-1(b). Section 23B
similarly prohibits a bank acting as fiduciary from purchasing or acquiring securities under-
written by an affiliate during the underwriting period, unless it is approved by a majority of the
bank's outside directors prior to the public offering. Id. §§ 371c-l(b)(1)(B), 371c-1(b)(2). Na-
tional and state member banks are required to file periodic reports under oath with federal
banking regulators that disclose relations between each bank and its affiliates. National banks
are required to file the reports quarterly. Id. § 161. State member banks are required to file
the reports three times a year. Id. § 334. Failure to file subjects the bank to a $100 per day
penalty. Id. §§ 161(c), 334.
140. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 32 (1987).
141. See Comptroller of the Currency, News Release, No. 85-75 (1987) (enforcing such
limits with regard to Continental Bank's extensions of credit to its subsidiary first options).
142. Bank loans to executive officers, directors, principal shareholders, or related interests
of banks or their affiliates must not be on preferential terms or pose abnormal risk of repay-
ment, must be approved by a disinterested majority of the bank's board of directors, and gener-
ally must not exceed the bank's limit on loans to a single borrower. 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a, 375b
(1982).
143. Id. § 375.
144. Id.
145. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-20 (1987) (statement of
Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency) (testimony on Comptroller's Office efforts to
combat insider abuse in national banks).
146. 12 U.S.C. §§ 481, 1844(c) (1982).
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the agencies also has general rulemaking authority 14 7 which enables them to
adopt appropriate regulations as needed to govern bank securities activities.
Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board has authority to order a bank holding
company to terminate or divest any activity whenever it has reasonable
cause to believe that the activity "constitutes a serious risk to the financial
safety, soundness, or stability of a bank holding company subsidiary
bank." 148
Federal banking regulators have various enforcement remedies available
to ensure compliance with laws applicable to bank securities activities.'49
For example, violations of sections 23A, 23B, and other restrictions are pun-
ishable by civil money penalties, not exceeding $1,000 per day, which may be
assessed against the violating bank or any bank officer, employee, or agent
responsible for the violation. 5o In addition, federal banking regulators have
cease-and-desist powers to prevent banking organizations from engaging in
unsafe and unsound practices or violations of law.' 5 ' Title V of S. 1886, the
Enforcement Powers Improvement Act of 1988, would strengthen these en-
forcement powers.
152
Under existing laws, banking organizations are required to notify federal
banking regulators or seek regulatory approval prior to engaging in non-
banking activities, including securities activities.'53 These procedures pro-
vide regulators with an additional mechanism to monitor such activities for
compliance with applicable laws and regulations as well as safety and sound-
147. Id. §§ 93a, 1817(k), 1844(b).
148. Id. § 1844(e).
149. See generally Deal, Bank Regulatory Enforcement--Some New Dimensions, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1319 (1985); Vartanian, Courts Precisely Defining Bank Regulator Powers, Legal Times,
March 18, 1985, at 19, col. 1.
150. 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(b)(1), 504(a), 1972(f).
151. Id. §§ 1818(c), 1844(e)(1).
152. See S. 1886, supra note 9, title IV.
153. Bank holding companies are required to obtain the Federal Reserve Board's approval
before commencing nonbanking activities or acquiring nonbanking companies. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8) (1982); see also 12 C.F.R. § 225.21-.25 (1987). Although national banks are not
statutorily required to obtain regulatory approval before engaging in nonbanking activities, the
Comptroller's regulations require a national bank to provide prior notice to the Comptroller
before commencing new activities in its subsidiaries. Banks and Banking, id. § 5.34(1). Fed-
eral Reserve Board Regulation H requires prior Board approval before a state member bank
may alter the scope of corporate powers exercised by the bank at the time of the bank's mem-
bership in the Federal Reserve System. Id. § 208.7(a)(1). In approving applications of state
nonmember banks for deposit insurance, the FDIC is required by statute to determine whether
the bank's corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1982). On the basis of this authority, the FDIC has promulgated
regulations governing certain securities activities of state nonmember banks which require
prior notice to the FDIC for certain activities. Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R. § 337 (1987).
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ness concerns. 154 As noted above, the banking regulators have utilized this
authority to impose extensive conditions on bank securities activities."'
Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act requires the Federal Re-
serve Board, in reviewing bank holding company proposals to engage in non-
banking activities, to consider whether the proposed activities "can
reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater
convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh ad-
verse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition, conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices."1
56
S. 1886 would require that the activities of securities affiliates meet this test.
In addition, S. 1886 specifically provides that the Board must be satisfied
that the bank holding company possesses the managerial resources to con-
duct proposed activities through a securities affiliate safely and soundly.'" 7
Banking organizations also are subject to the antitrust laws 58 which pro-
hibit combinations that substantially lessen competition, 9 result in monop-
oly power,"W or restrain trade. 16  In addition, as noted, the BHCA
specifically requires that the Federal Reserve Board consider the potential
for decreased or unfair competition and undue concentration of resources in
approving bank holding company acquisitions of nonbank companies.
62
S. 1886 would add specific concentration limits under which the Board may
not approve any acquisition that would result in the affiliation of a bank
holding company or a bank with total assets of more than $30 billion with an
investment bank with total assets of more than $15 billion.' 63 Banking orga-
nizations are also subject to existing statutory prohibitions on tying arrange-
ments that may result in unfair competition.' 64
154. For example, section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA, requires the Federal Reserve Board to
determine whether a specific bank holding company's performance of a particular activity
"can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience,
increase competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as
undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interests, or
unsound banking practices." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
155. See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
156. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
157. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 102.
158. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 354-55 (1963).
159. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
160. Sherman Antitrust Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
161. The Bank Merger Act and the BHCA specifically apply antitrust standards compara-
ble to those in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, but allow violations of the antitrust laws to be
mitigated by factors relating to the "convenience and needs of the community." 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1828(c)(5), 1842(c) (1982).
162. Id. § 1843(c)(8).
163. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 102.
164. Banks and bank holding companies are prohibited from providing services or ex-
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F Deference to Securities Regulation
The securities laws provide an additional layer of regulation that ad-
dresses many of the concerns regarding the conduct of expanded securities
activities by banking organizations. Depending on its activities, a securities
affiliate would be regulated by one or all of the SEC, the Commodities Fu-
tures Trading Commission, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, the
National Association of Securities Dealers, and individual stock and com-
modities exchanges, as well as by state securities regulatory authorities. The
statutes and regulations enforced by these regulatory bodies provide effective
safeguards against conflicts of interest and abusive practices in the securities
business. For example, the federal securities laws require registration of se-
curities broker-dealers and investment advisers, 165 compliance with net capi-
tal and disclosure requirements, 166  registration of publicly offered
securities, 167 and periodic reporting by issuers of such securities. 1
68
The extent to which banking organizations should be subject to the securi-
ties laws and SEC jurisdiction with respect to their securities activities is a
nettlesome question on which the banking agencies and the SEC have dis-
agreed for years.169 Banks currently are exempt 170 from enforcement of se-
curities regulations by the SEC, but are subject to similar regulation by the
banking agencies.1 7 ' Bank holding companies and their nonbank affiliates
are not exempt from SEC enforcement, and frequently must comply with
dual regulations of the SEC and the banking agencies addressing the same
regulatory concerns. The antifraud provisions of the securities laws are ap-
tending credit on the condition that the customer obtain additional services from a bank or
nonbank affiliate or that the customer not obtain credit or services from a competitor. 12
U.S.C. § 1972(l)(B) (1982). Banks and bank holding companies similarly may not fix or vary
the price of any extension of credit or service on such conditions. Id.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982).
166. See generally id. § 77g.
167. See generally id. §§ 77d, 77e, 77f, 77j.
168. See generally id. §§ 78m, 78o(d).
169. The SEC attempted to assert jurisdiction over bank securities brokerage activities in
1985 when it promulgated rule 3b-9 requiring banks engaged in such activities to register as
broker-dealers under the Exchange Act. 50 Fed. Reg. 28,385 (July 12, 1985). The banking
agencies objected and the American Bankers Association successfully argued in court that the
SEC has no jurisdiction to regulate banks as broker-dealers. American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC,
804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (overturning SEC rule 3b-9).
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(5), 77d, 78c(a)(4), 78c(a)(5) (1982).
171. See, e.g., id. 781(i); 12 C.F.R. §§ 11, 206 (1987). The Federal Reserve Board recently
amended its regulations to provide that state member banks required by the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 781(b), (g) (1982), to file certain information with the Board must do so on the forms
prescribed by the SEC for other entities subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange
Act. Amendment of Regulation F, 52 Fed. Reg. 49,374, 49,376 (1987) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 208.16).
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plicable to securities activities of all banks, bank holding companies, and
their affiliates.172
The expansion of securities powers of banking organizations will require
careful coordination of the securities and banking laws in order to avoid
regulatory duplication and conflict. Congress should defer as much as possi-
ble to the existing securities regulation system to govern expanded securities
activities of bank holding companies rather than establishing yet another
layer of regulation to govern such activities. The public benefits of expanded
bank securities activities will not be realized if banking organizations are
burdened by layers of unnecessary and overlapping regulations. The securi-
ties laws should govern bank securities affiliates in matters relating to inves-
tor protection, potential conflicts, advertising and disclosure issues, and
abusive practices that are within the realm of the securities laws. To the
extent that new statutory or regulatory conditions imposed on expanded
bank securities activities address the same issues that are addressed by the
securities laws, banking organizations will be needlessly burdened by compli-
ance with overlapping and potentially inconsistent regulations. 173
Deference to the securities regulatory framework would further the inter-
ests of market efficiency by allowing bank holding companies to compete on
the same terms and conditions as their securities industry competitors.
Thus, for example, bank holding companies should be permitted to under-
write securitized assets of their affiliates to the same extent as their securities
industry counterparts without additional regulatory requirements.
To the extent that banks may be authorized to engage directly in securities
activities, however, Congress should avoid subjecting those activities that are
closely related to traditional banking functions to securities law regulation.
For example, brokerage for trust accounts, self-directed IRA accounts, se-
curities safekeeping, trading for the bank's own account, and similar activi-
ties are traditional bank activities that alone should not subject a bank to
securities regulation. Such activities are subject to extensive bank regulation
and the imposition of securities regulation on such activities would be un-
duly burdensome and unnecessary.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
173. Deference to the securities laws would be consistent with the recommendations of the
Vice President's Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services, which advocates regulation
of financial institutions according to the functions they perform. U.S. TASK GROUP ON REGU-
LATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK
GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 39-41 (1984). The Task Group Report,
which was endorsed by all of the bank regulatory agencies and the SEC, recommends transfer-
ring responsibility for administering and enforcing securities registration and disclosure re-
quirements applicable to banks under the securities laws from the bank regulatory agencies to
the SEC. Id. at 92.
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S. 1886 adopts a position of deference to the securities laws by requiring
that most of the expanded bank securities activities be conducted in a securi-
ties affiliate subject to the SEC's jurisdiction. With respect to securities ac-
tivities authorized directly for banks, S. 1886 embodies a compromise with
respect to the appropriate division of jurisdiction worked out by the SEC
and the banking agencies.
S. 1886 would amend the definition of "broker" in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193474 to include banks actively engaged in soliciting cus-
tomers to buy and sell securities and bank brokerage activities for which a
bank receives incentive compensation.' 7 5 In addition, S. 1886 would require
banks to transfer their public brokerage business into separate, SEC-regu-
lated affiliates.'
76
However, banks could continue performing certain securities services that
are incidental to traditional banking functions without the necessity of regis-
tration under the Exchange Act. For example, brokerage services for trust
accounts would not require registration under S. 1886 unless the bank re-
ceives incentive compensation and publicly solicits brokerage business.' 7 7
Similarly, securities safekeeping, IRA, and managed agency accounts would
require registration only if the bank publicly solicits such business separately
and receives incentive compensation or offers execution services in connec-
tion with securities safekeeping.' 78 Additionally, safe deposit box services,
escrow arrangements, and holding securities as collateral for loans similarly
would be permitted without registration. 79  Furthermore, exemptions
would be provided for "networking" arrangements under which a bank may
contract with an affiliated or unaffiliated broker-dealer to provide brokerage
services to bank customers on bank premises, for "sweep" arrangements
under which customer bank deposits are swept into money market mutual
funds, and for private placement activities.' Banks that do not have a se-
curities affiliate pursuant to section 4(c)(15) of the BHCA could effect trans-
actions in municipal securities without registering as a broker; banks with
such an affiliate would be required to transfer municipal activities to the
affiliate. '
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982).
175. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 301.
176. S. 1886 would amend the Exchange Act to prohibit a bank from becoming a broker
except on an exclusively intrastate basis, id. § 304, thereby requiring banks to create separate
affiliates or subsidiaries to conduct broker-dealer activities.
177. Id. § 301.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id
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S. 1886 would continue to exclude banks from the definition of "dealer"18 2
in the Exchange Act with respect to transactions for the bank's account in
commercial paper and bankers acceptances and, in addition, municipal se-
curities if the bank does not have a securities affiliate. 183 Similarly, a bank
could deal in its own securitized assets without registering as a dealer. 184
Banking organizations would be subjected by S. 1886 to SEC regulation
under the Investment Company Act 85 with respect to mutual fund activi-
ties.186 S. 1886 would amend the Investment Company Act to address isues
arising when an investment company becomes affiliated with a bank. For
instance, a bank would be permitted to serve as trustee for an affiliated unit
investment trust only in accordance with rules adopted by the SEC after
written consultation with the banking agencies.18 7 Similarly, a registered
investment company would be prohibited from knowingly acquiring, during
an underwriting, any third party security the proceeds of which will be used
to retire indebtedness owed to a bank that sponsors, organizes, or under-
writes the company."8 In order to promote coordinated regulation of bank
investment adviser activities, S. 1886 would require the SEC to notify a
bank's primary federal banking regulator prior to initiating any examination
or enforcement action against any bank, bank division, or bank holding com-
pany registered as an investment adviser. 89 The SEC and federal banking
regulators would be required to share reports of examinations of bank invest-
ment advisory activities. 90
The need for coordinated bank and securities regulation will be ongoing
and will become even more acute if securities firms are permitted to acquire
banks. 91 S. 1886 recognizes this need by directing the Federal Reserve
182. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1982).
183. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 302.
184. Id.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
186. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 401. S. 1886 would eliminate the current exclusion from the
definition of "investment adviser" in the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1)
(1982), for banks and bank holding companies serving as investment advisers to registered
investment companies unless, in the case of a bank, the bank conducts such activity through a
separate department or division in which case only that department or division must register as
an investment adviser. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 408.
187. S. 1886, supra note 9, § 401.
188. Id. § 402.
189. Id. § 411.
190. Id.; see also id. § 412 (authorizing the SEC to share information with federal banking
regulators and other federal and state agencies for law enforcement purposes).
191. S. 1886 would amend the BHCA to allow the acquisition of banks by "diversified
financial holding companies," defined as companies that devote 80% of their total assets to
activities permissible under sections §§ 4(c)(8), 4(c)(13), 4(c)(14), and proposed § 4(c)(15) of
the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 1843(c)(8), (13)-(15) (1982), and devote no more than 20% of their total
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Board and the SEC to prepare, within one year, a joint study for Congress
addressing issues relating to harmonizing regulation.' 9 2 Such issues are to
include the advisability of consolidated regulation of companies controlling
banks or securities firms, appropriate techniques for supervision of affiliate
transactions within such firms, international financial harmonization, and
the nature and techniques used in supervising banking and securities organi-
zations. 193 The Board and the SEC also are directed to develop proposed
revisions to harmonize capital adequacy standards of banking and securities
organizations 194 and to report annually to Congress regarding their progress
toward and recommendations for achieving regulatory harmony. 195
IV. CONCLUSION
Reports of Glass-Steagall's death may be premature. In the past, Con-
gress has retreated when faced with opportunities to liberalize bank securi-
ties activities.' 96 The stock market volatility in October of 1987 has
provided a new focal point for securities industry opposition to expanded
bank securities powers. Other industries facing competition from banking
organizations, notably the insurance and real estate industries, may seek to
hold hostage any new securities powers to demands that Congress ban bank
competition in those industries.197 Faced with a clash of competing interest
groups, Congress may find it impossible to fashion a politically acceptable
compromise in an election year with early adjournment scheduled.198 Con-
gressional failure to enact Glass-Steagall reform legislation, however, will
assets to the ownership of FDIC-insured banks or FSLIC-insured institutions. S. 1886, supra
note 9, § 110.
192. S. 1886, supra note 9, § Ill.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. For example, in 1984 a bill to expand bank securities powers was passed by an over-
whelming majority in the Senate but failed to win House approval. S. 2181, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984) (approved by the Senate on Sept. 13, 1984).
197. The insurance industry succeeded in adding strict limitations on insurance activities of
banking organizations in title VIII of S. 1886. The National Association of Realtors succeeded
in adding a provision limiting bank real estate activities to the proposed St Germain-Wylie
Depository Institutions Act of 1988, DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS ACT COMMITTEE PRINT,
supra note 9, § 144. Consumer groups have also demanded that their interests be addressed in
any Glass-Steagall reform. Banking trade groups have announced that they will oppose any
federal banking reform legislation that places new restrictions on nonbanking activities cur-
rently authorized under state laws. The trade groups include the American Bankers Associa-
tion, Association of Bank Holding Companies, Association of Reserve City Bankers, Bank
Capital Markets Association, Consumer Bankers Association, and the Independent Bankers
Association. Six Banking Trade Groups Would Oppose Bill to Restrict State-Authorized Pow-
ers, 50 Banking Rep. (BNA), Feb. 8, 1988, at 193, col. 2.
198. Proceedings in the House of Representatives on Glass-Steagall reform legislation are
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ensure a further weakening of the banking system as banking organizations
see their traditional business erode and their profits shrink in the face of
competition for financial services which they cannot provide under current
law.
The separate affiliate concept offers a viable alternative for expanded bank
securities powers. The Senate-passed Proxmire Financial Modernization
Act of 1988, embracing this concept, offers Congress the opportunity to
usher in a new era of banking better aligned with market realities and cus-
tomer financial needs consistent with the traditional role of banking and
safety and soundness principles. But Congress should not lock into place a
set of rigid restrictions that will deny banking organizations the flexibility to
respond to further evolution of the financial markets. Deference to existing
securities regulations and a willingness to allow the regulatory agencies to
structure appropriate regulations to accomodate future market changes ac-
cording to a broad congressional mandate will avoid further years of pro-
tracted legal struggle and congressional paralysis over the appropriate scope
of bank securities activities.
complicated by the joint jurisdiction over such legislation by the Committee on Banking, Fi-
nance, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce.
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